BENTLY 1900/65A-00-04-01-00-00 servo module

BENTLY 1900/65A-00-04-01-00-00 servo module

BENTLY 1900/65A-00-04-01-00-00 servo module

The three failures were roughly the same, with all operating stations, control stations, and monitoring stations of the two systems experiencing communication interruptions. The control station is working normally, but the operation station has completely lost its operation and monitoring functions. All positions displaying instrument data in the screen are replaced by asterisks, and the screen can be flipped. The timer is still timing, indicating that the operation station itself is working normally. The main difference in the fault phenomenon is that when the first fault occurs, the HF BUS bus in the operating station system condition screen changes from green to red, indicating a bus fault. When the next two faults occur, the HF BUS bus displays normal. When the first fault occurred, the control card of the 21 # control station of the urea plant was switched; When the second fault occurred, the control card of the 22 # control station of the urea plant was switched; When the third fault occurred, the control cards of Station 21 and Station 22 switched simultaneously. The six control stations of the synthetic ammonia plant always operate normally. A large amount of communication fault alarm information was collected during the normal operation and fault period of DCS. The alarm information that occurred several months before and at the time of the second communication failure is now listed in Table 1. Based on the display of bus fault information in the system condition screen when the first communication fault occurs, it is believed that the HF BUS bus is redundant and communication will only be interrupted when both buses are simultaneously damaged. To verify the above analysis, simulation experiments were conducted during the parking period, where two HF BUS buses were manually disconnected and various combinations of disconnection points were performed. The experimental results did not reproduce the phenomenon of communication failure in the system, and some instrument data at the operating station still displayed. Through these data, the operating station can still control the on-site instruments.

The three failures were roughly the same, with all operating stations, control stations, and monitoring stations of the two systems experiencing communication interruptions. The control station is working normally, but the operation station has completely lost its operation and monitoring functions. All positions displaying instrument data in the screen are replaced by asterisks, and the screen can be flipped. The timer is still timing, indicating that the operation station itself is working normally. The main difference in the fault phenomenon is that when the first fault occurs, the HF BUS bus in the operating station system condition screen changes from green to red, indicating a bus fault. When the next two faults occur, the HF BUS bus displays normal. When the first fault occurred, the control card of the 21 # control station of the urea plant was switched; When the second fault occurred, the control card of the 22 # control station of the urea plant was switched; When the third fault occurred, the control cards of Station 21 and Station 22 switched simultaneously. The six control stations of the synthetic ammonia plant always operate normally. A large amount of communication fault alarm information was collected during the normal operation and fault period of DCS. The alarm information that occurred several months before and at the time of the second communication failure is now listed in Table 1. Based on the display of bus fault information in the system condition screen when the first communication fault occurs, it is believed that the HF BUS bus is redundant and communication will only be interrupted when both buses are simultaneously damaged. To verify the above analysis, simulation experiments were conducted during the parking period, where two HF BUS buses were manually disconnected and various combinations of disconnection points were performed. The experimental results did not reproduce the phenomenon of communication failure in the system, and some instrument data at the operating station still displayed. Through these data, the operating station can still control the on-site instruments.